808. That this is indeed the case is also established as fact through all such contrasts being "relative". If, for example, we think that something or other is "beautiful", the expression "beautiful" will be only a description of that thing's relationship to our "I". But since at the same time there may be others who consider the same thing to be "ugly", this description will likewise be an expression of the particular relationship between that thing and the other beings' "I". But if some people think that the thing is "beautiful" while others think it is "ugly", which of these descriptions is the absolutely valid one? The answer must be – absolutely neither. The thing in itself has no analysis. Wherever there is no relationship between "I" and "it", it can in its deepest nature exist only as "X" and is, as previously described in "Livets Bog", identical to "something no. 1", which is the same as "X1". Everything we express about the things we see is not the absolute nature of the things but merely a description of the relationship between the things and our own "I". That the sensory impressions are thus, in a way, illusions is certainly difficult for many to understand. They will claim that because one being considers a thing to be "black" and another "white", it may perhaps be correct that the thing is in essence neither "black" nor "white", but that it should thereby exist as something imperceptible and thus be synonymous with "X", cannot be correct because there can be other beings who also sense the thing – albeit not as "black" or "white" but in some other way. And if they can sense the thing, it cannot be synonymous with "X". But here we have to repeat what we have already stated that if the thing can be sensed, there exists a relationship between this thing and the origin of the sensory perception or "I". And it is precisely this relationship, and not the thing itself, that is sensed. When a being senses something as "black" and is unable to sense it in any other way, absolutely any other view of the thing must be synonymous with "X" for this being. But a thing that for the senses can be synonymous with "X" alone, that is to say, can exist only as imperceptible to the senses, is irrefutably identical to "X1". Obviously, it cannot be deleted or be treated as "nothing", since it can be sensed by other beings and therefore unfailingly exists with the analysis: "something that is".