Martinus: Livets Bog, vol. 3, sect. 792

792. But this is fundamentally substantiated by the circumstance that each and every one of us senses the existence of this "something" and expresses our acknowledgment of it quite automatically in the form of the concept of "I". This concept is a means that we have invented in order to be able to express or emphasise with its help the separation of the I or the "something" from the "movement", and the word we use for this latter reality is "it". "I" and "it" therefore constitute the fundamental analysis of the living being's own sense of itself. If this "something", which cannot be sensed, did not exist, there would be only the "movements", and the sense of its own appearance or existence could then be only "it". But if this "something" did not exist, neither would there be any "I" at all from which "it" could be separated. And the living being's existence and experience of life would then be impossible. The contrast upon which the living being's entire existence and appearance is based would be totally lacking. Every being that is advanced in development senses itself as "I" and "it". The I expresses the being's own identity, and "it" expresses the phenomena or manifestations that are subject to its will and the remaining surroundings.