Livets Bog, vol. 3
The "something" that governs "movement" is not here or there. It is not up or down. It can exist only with the analysis: "something that is"
791. As "X3" in itself consists exclusively of "movement", and it is exclusively "movement" that is accessible to sensory perception, this governing "something" is therefore absolutely not to be found in "X3" or the area that is accessible to sensory perception. It is to be found only outside this area. But as the sensory area represents the area where all "movement" has its domain, and this domain, which is the same as the world of materials or matter and hence of forms, is infinite, there will not in reality exist anything whatsoever "outside" of it. There are certainly no intellectual human beings who doubt that the universe continues beyond the galaxies, sun cities, stars and planets that are at present visible. In order for the universe to be able to exist with an absolute boundary, there would have to exist an absolute "nothing" for it to border up against. But as this is a complete impossibility it is established as a fact that there cannot possibly exist something "outside" that faces the universe. But where is this governing "something" that is above the "movement"? Well, this in fact brings us to the very reason why it is described as "X". The "movements" or the inability of the sensory area to exist independently proves the existence of this "something", but at the same time it also proves that this existence is impossible within the world of "movements" and must therefore appear "outside" it. But since the "movements" further establish that this "outside" does not exist, what can one then say about this "something"? As none of the three facts can be refuted, being completely logical realities, they reveal or prove a new reality to be a fact, namely that this "something" or the source of the "movements" does not come under the laws or conditions that are required for the "movements" to be able to take place or exist. So in what way does this "something" differ from the "movements"? It differs from them first and foremost by not requiring "space", "location", "time" or any other form of created traditions or occurrences in order to exist. It exists quite independently of these realities and constitutes this one single analysis: "something that is". But it is not "here" or "there". It is not "up" or "down". This "here" or "there", "up" or "down" is something it "produces", which means visible effects of its invisible existence, or its existence that is inaccessible to sensory perception, and comes within the "movements". Everything else that might be said about a thing – for instance that it is "large" or "small", that it is "well made" or "less well made", that it is "beautiful" or "less beautiful", that it is "evil" or "good" and so on – can in no instance whatsoever constitute an accurate analysis of this "something", because these are all without exception also "types of movement", "products" or "created phenomena", and as such are subsidiary results of a "something" that exercises will, which can be identified only as the aforementioned "something that is". And it is precisely on account of this logical exercising of will, and the manifestation of thought or consciousness connected with it, that the existence of this "something" is established as a fact, thereby revealing that there exists something more than just the "movement".