Livets Bog, vol. 3
When the I and the "movement" meet
789. The absolute, primary source of all "movement", and thereby of all consciousness, is to be found in "X2". In the area of "X2" there appears, as previously mentioned, the remarkable state, which is not found in any other area whatsoever, in which the "movement" borders onto, not a relative, but an absolute "fixed point". But if this "fixed point", which is the same as "X1" or the I, does not in itself constitute "material" or "matter", how can it have any influence on the "movement"? And how can the "movement" have any influence on the I, whose very nature is absolute stillness?
      Well, here the answer is that these two factors have not the slightest influence on each other in a directly material way. The contact of these two factors takes place in a way or in a situation to which there is no parallel within the world of the senses. Their contact cannot in itself be sensed. As it is, the I cannot be sensed and thus cannot in itself constitute any kind of sensory contrast to the "movement". The moment the "movement" meets the I and can therefore no longer be contrasted with other types of movement, it will be beyond sensory perception. In this situation it will be totally identical to the "X" with which it has merged. But since this meeting of the "movement" with the I nevertheless leaves behind it the effect that can be perceived with the senses and that we call the "experience of life", which is the same as the being's sense of "I" and "it", this meeting between the I and the "movement" cannot be explained away or denied, but must remain as the very first source of all sensing.
      That the meeting of these two factors is not of the kind that we would otherwise define as the contact of two energies with each other, can also be established as a fact in another way. When two energies make contact with each other, a collision occurs between the two "forms of movement". We usually describe such a collision as a "reaction", just as it is just such a reaction that causes what we call "wear and tear", "weathering", the "tooth of time" or the like.
      As the I is not "material" and consequently does not represent "movement" either, no "wear and tear" can result from the meeting of the "movement" with the I, as is the case when the "movement" meets another "movement". The meeting between the I and the "movement" therefore lies beyond everything that comes under the terms "wear and tear" or the "tooth of time", and it thereby represents an "eternal existence", or what we describe as the beings' "immortality".